Berber was not an anti-imperialist. His position may more accurately be characterised as counter-imperial, proposing an alternative way of Eurocentric ordering, as he first appropriated Indian colonial victimhood to carve out a distinct position within
Europe's own struggles about the meaning of Western sovereignty, and then put forward a vision of supranational organisation that cast Germany as a civiliser apart from other Western powers. It was as a representative of the West that Berber advised Nehru's government and his attitudes to India were deeply Orientalist. Berber's oppositional legal knowledge emerged out of a specific political constellation that enabled him to challenge accepted norms of international law both during the Third Reich and the post-war period of 'decolonization'. 8 Ultimately, his trajectory points towards the necessity of writing a history of international law that is not limited by a dualistic framing of 'West' versus 'rest', and takes seriously the complex and contradictory orderings that result from its imperial legacy.
Law and empire after 1919
It is hard to over-emphasise the devastating impact of the First World War on the credibility of Eurocentric international law. "The late war", wrote an Indian observer "was waged in contravention of the accepted law of nations and in defiance of all notions of international morality". Not only were European states caught flouting international law, those who professed to be able to say what international law actually was had been exposed as fantasists. "The practice among states is thus contrary to the high-sounding theories of publicists, prize courts, congresses and conferences." This conclusion inspired legal scholars in India to recover indigenous traditions of international law based on ancient practise, for instance the doctrine of equity, justice and good conscience. Diktat with calls for solidarity among those oppressed by the 'West'. In a pamphlet published by a Christian youth group, Berber argued that the world's territory had to be distributed in an "equitable" way. "It is inequitable that a country with a declining population possesses an overabundance of colonies, whereas a rapidly growing people are deprived of all areas of settlement. This perspective on international politics means that, for instance, the question of Indian freedom is also our question, and the question of Versailles is that of the entire world."
Asking for the restitution of German colonies in the same breath as campaigning for Indian national liberation may seem paradoxical. Berber, however, asserted that Germany's shameful treatment at the hands of the victors of the world war had made its population "suffer more deeply from the tragedy that exists all around us than elsewhere" and gave
Germans a unique insight into world politics, distinct from that of other Europeans. 12 Berber was not alone in fusing sympathy for anticolonial movements with visions for a German colonial rebirth. Conservative publicists, for example, supported sizeable diasporic communities of Indian students and activists in Berlin and Munich.
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Religion was another influence on Berber. His father had been a preacher in the Methodist church, an isolated minority at odds with the quasi-religious nationalism of imperial another foreign policy institute in 1937. Ribbentrop, who wanted to integrate research and propaganda functions, rewarded Berber with a professorship at the University of Berlin. 38 Berber also became a contributor to a key journal published by SS jurists that legitimated genocide.
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While Berber was institutionally committed to National Socialism, his ideological adherence to the party line was questioned. Among the positions that German international lawyers embraced under the Nazis his might best be described as that of a liberal nationalist trying to adjust to new realities. Committed Nazis eyed him with suspicion and when he was considered for a professorial appointment in 1936 he was found to lack a "National-Socialist personality that was above challenge". The assessment was based partly on Berber's 1934 study Sicherheit und Gerechtigkeit (Security and Justice). 40 With this book, which Berber described to a Quaker friend as giving "a strong expression to the new German Peace conception outside the League of Nations", he hoped to establish his academic reputation, even planning for an English translation.
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A polemic against liberal international law written in a religious key, the book's argument can be summarised as follows: after the First World War, international law took a "soteriological" turn and became a quasi-theological theory of salvation. It encroached on areas which had hitherto been a part of international politics, notably the right to wage war.
This new international law promoted the idea that inter-state conflict represented nothing but differences in opinion over how to interpret legal rules and constructed a "utopia" in which "all appearing conflicts are only disagreements about the interpretation of law which can be solved by a court operating under predictable certainty; these are attempts to turn world history into world adjudication, to turn domestic politics into constitutional jurisdiction".
Quoting Schmitt, Berber argued that such a "total legal order" (universelles Ordnungsprogramm) did not promote world peace but benefitted the victors of the world war by enshrining an unequal status quo as a universal order under the watchword of 'security'.
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These points were compatible with a traditionalist interpretation of international law as they emphasised Germany's subdued position among European powers and the limitations of the League.
Berber took this critique further by arguing that soteriological international law was based on a disenchanted rationality. "It is of key importance for the post-war soteriology that But, and here Berber made a rhetorical move that positioned Germany outside the West, "the monopoly of the Western powers on a post-war soteriology was broken in front of the entire world; the soteriological character of German radical nationalism became apparent, but in a significantly harder, bitterer and more disillusioned key: German soteriology is not based on the unease of the disappointed victor or the new owner's bad conscience but the plight of a beaten, humiliated, tormented and Lebensraum-deprived great and proud Volk." German soteriology was built on völkisch assertiveness, not abstract rules, which only left a "modest role" for international law as a sometime "agent of justice": "justice is a matter of mastery; it is the great art of tact and of wisdom in political matters, which, in a rationalistic, mechanistic and materialistic age has almost completely been lost". 44 By insisting on the existence of an elusive justice, which only subaltern Germans could grasp,
Berber performed a kind of "self-Orientalization" that found its parallels in coterminous discussions among German geo-politicians. 45 Anti-colonial nationalists, for their part, rarely believed that European fascism had anything to offer to colonial peoples. Nehru, for example, regarded fascism and imperialism as variants of the same ideology.
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At the same time Berber recommended exploiting international law to project an alternative political philosophy. Berber called this approach the "politics of international law" (Völkerrechtspolitik). Anticipating Schmitt, who declared a "war of international legal studies"
(völkerrechtswissenschaftlicher Kampf) on universalist international law, Berber argued that international law was, and should be, inherently political. 47 He also sought to distinguish himself from Carl Schmitt's Großraum concept which he criticised as "too imperalistic", even if Berber adopted other Schmittian terms such as raumfremde Macht, a power foreign to a Großraum. 77 Although Berber would later use this divergence as evidence of his anti-Nazi convictions (although he published them at a time when Schmitt had lost much of his influence), it is more likely that he simply threw his hat into the ring of the debates that accompanied the improvised and violent process of building
Hitler's empire. 78 The interesting point about this disagreement beyond the well-documented antipathy between the two jurists consists of Berber's insistence that a Greater Germany ought to try its best to not be perceived as an empire. 79 Again, the British Commonwealth served as a model as it "wisely avoided giving the leading power Great Britain a title that would have loudly announced it as such". 80 German universalism could be fused together.
Berber himself became increasingly embroiled in the vicious infighting within the polycratic Nazi foreign policy system and decided to pursue his 'politics of international law'
elsewhere. After a blackmailing attempt by an SS officer who knew about Berber's involvement with religious internationalism, Berber convinced Ribbentrop to send him to Geneva permanently. 81 Here, Berber turned to humanitarian international law for the purposes of the German war effort as a legal adviser at the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). At Ribbentrop's behest Berber surveyed prospects for a separate peace with Britain, and initiated an ICRC proposal to establish no-bombing zones for civilian populations which the Allies rejected as Germany would have been the major beneficiary.
The basic idea, however, was taken up in the 1949 Geneva Convention. 82 Berber also engaged in what he later described as 'humanitarian missions' that furnished him with a post-war alibi. 83 Attempts to settle in Switzerland after the war failed as the authorities expelled Berber to the French zone of Allied-occupied Germany where he first worked as a defence lawyer and then as a legal adviser to the French military government.
In 1949 he emerged from his own de-nazification tribunal as a fellow traveller (Mitläufer) but was barred from an academic post. 84 Berber's career, for a long time dedicated to the doomed attempt to bring Hitler's aggressive bid for a race-based empire into alignment with an approach to liberal international law that took advantage of its internal contradictions, had in Czechoslovakia Berber asserted that the "country was undoubtedly recognised at Yalta as being within the Russian sphere of influence" and the sovereignty of small nations a casualty of international law's diminished role. But he also recognised that it was necessary to rebuild international law's normative authority which could not be done by discredited European governments. Berber declared that "spiritual power alone can now save the world -the power that is more prevalent in the East, in India and China, evidenced by Gandhi's life and methods, and which is largely lacking in the West", a statement that resonated with a German Orientalist tradition that had often sought to appropriate 'Eastern' traits. Berber's expressed desire to "go to India and co-operate there" with the Quakers represented more than a careerist's desperate move in a difficult situation. 86 It also reflected a shrewd understanding of who possessed moral authority in a decolonizing world.
In this new constellation Indians emerged as the most vocal representatives of the anti-colonial cause. They used international institutions as a platform but remained sceptical of international law as it had been shaped by the great powers. When the Indian delegation to the United Nations famously charged South Africa with racial discrimination in the first session of the General Assembly, it did so in contravention of the domestic jurisdiction clause in the charter. 87 Indian jurists made their mark in the post-war legal order, none more so than Radhabinod Pal, one of the three dissenting judges at the Tokyo International
Military Tribunal which opened in 1946. Pal not only denied that the charges brought against the Japanese defendants were legitimate but questioned the motives of the prosecuting powers and argued that outlawing crimes against peace could be used to withhold justice from colonial peoples. As German jurists had done in the interwar years, Pal objected to the use of law for upholding an inequitable status quo. to New Delhi as a legal adviser.
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Outwardly an odd choice, Berber was particularly suited to the job. He understood intra-imperial relations as a part of international law which sensitised him to the pre-Partition complexities of the dispute. India's post-independence foreign policy strove to establish the country as a 'moral power', even if Nehru remained conscious of the limits of moral capital in international politics. 100 Thus India could not afford to be seen flouting international law and needed an adviser adept at juggling legal concepts and political realities. As a German, Pakistan's legal adviser in the canal dispute. Unsurprisingly, the Indians argued that states should be free to develop their water use according to their needs while the Pakistanis emphasized the priority of existing uses. 108 Berber also joined the committee and published a book in which he argued that there was no such thing as a global customary water law.
Any future law would have to be based on the outcome of political negotiations: "The motley diversity exhibited by water treaties is nothing other than a reflection of the motley diversity of international relations in general." 109 Thus he prepared the ground for the eventual treaty.
After securing a professorship in Munich in 1954, Berber continued to work for the Indian government, influencing the ILA rivers committee. 110 An opinion he submitted to the ILA in 1957 (which was circulated by the Indian foreign ministry to its missions) reiterated the unsettled nature of international water law in a world which had only recently recognised the sovereign equality of many nations. 111 The political purpose behind Berber's treatise was to Berber to simultaneously participate in racist and imperial projects and resist being subsumed within a uniform, hegemonic discourse of Western international law.
Is there no escape from imperial international law? In the case of this jurist who chose to analyse the international system from the perspective of two disruptive powers the answer is no. At historically specific junctures both Indians and Germans believed that international law was structured in a way which stacked the odds against them but also that these structures could be broken up and remoulded according to radically different norms.
This attitude is visible in the Nazi's murderous attempt to build a New Order in Europe as well as India's insistence that it would be possible to shape the international system according to alternative logics that bypassed Cold War realities. In both cases, ideas about order were inextricably linked to their legal expressions and operated in a system of power in which Western norms were at the centre. And in both cases, the actors wanted to usurp the normative power of Western international law, not abolish it. Searching for the critical instability at the heart of international law, we might be well advised to look sideways, not so much at an opposition between West and rest but at the long continuities of empire, power differentials, racism, and civilizational hierarchies which create a much more complex and contradictory ordering.
